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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: The article deals with an ambitious transport and economic project “the Belt and 
Road Initiative” (BRI), also known as “One Belt One Road” or “New Silk Road”. It entails 
achievement of economic prosperity by the countries along the Silk Road, their sustainable 
economic development and strengthening the cooperation between the regions.   
Design/Methodology/Approach: The subject of this research allows for using a combination 
of various methods and approaches, such as comparative method, statistical, systematic 
approach, structural and dynamic analysis, which form the methodological basis of the 
research. Content analysis and synthesis methods were applied to identify the ideological 
content and essence of the Chinese BRI towards the ASEAN countries. 
Findings: The authors have identified that the ASEAN countries are involved in the BRI due 
to development of China Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC) and the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road. Strategic areas, such as sustainable infrastructure, digital 
innovation, seamless logistics, and people mobility have been investigated to build up a 
regional network of people and infrastructure. The authors have come to the conclusion, that 
CICPEC has a great impulse to launch a new era of China-ASEAN cooperation. 
Practical implications: On the basis of the analysis of the China – ASEAN cooperation, the 
authors have pointed out the most prospective spheres for further strengthening their links. 
Besides, the authors have evaluated the potential risks for both sides.   
Originality/Value: The analysis of evolution of the China-ASEAN relations provides the 
understanding of China’s interests in the ASEAN partnership.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2013, Chinese President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party 
Xi Jinping inaugurated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), his signature economic 
and foreign policy project designed to finance and build infrastructure and 
connectivity around the world, with a focus on Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region. 
China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the signature foreign policy and 
geo-economics project of Chinese President and General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping, who has extolled it as the “project of the 
century.”5 What BRI means in practice is still coming into focus, but Beijing’s 
aspirations for the initiative are clear: encouraging domestic development and 
increasing control in China’s outer provinces, expanding markets and exporting 
technical standards, building hard and digital infrastructure, bolstering energy 
security, expanding the reach of China’s military to protect overseas interests, and 
advancing geopolitical influence. 
 
The BRI covers the in land ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SCREB) and the sea-based 
the “21st century Maritime silk road” (MSR). SCREB covers six economic 
corridors: New Eurasia Land Bridge, China-Mongolia Russia; China-Central Asia-
West Asia; China-Pakistan; Indochina China; and Bangladesh-China-India-
Myanmar. The additional "Maritime silk road" provides for the development of key 
seaports along traditional and new sea routes to Southeast Asia, Africa and the 
Mediterranean region with good connections to land transport routes (Hans-Dieter 
and Menkhof, 2018). There are 6 BRI routes and China has economic interests all 
over the world. Nevertheless, South-East Asia, due to its geographical location and 
trade routes passing through it, is reasonably perceived as the "core" of China's 
interests (Terskikh, 2019). The development of relations with ASEAN as a whole 
and with its 10 member countries separately remains one of the top priorities in the 
Chinese foreign policy paradigm. 
 
China seeks to ensure a secure and controlled buffer along its borders – the "belt of 
peace, stability and joint prosperity". China's current position in Southeast Asia is 
very strong and based on mutual pragmatism, which is largely due to significant 
achievements in trade, economic and investment cooperation. Bilateral agreements 
in politics, security and defense are steadily developing. Cultural and humanitarian 
ties are closely linked, and designed to prosper mutual future (Vlasov, 2015). 
Southeast Asia has historically been in the sphere of China's interests. For a long 
time, the peoples of this region used to be were under Chinese governance due to 
vassal-suzerain relations. But in the XIX century the power in the Region shifted 
towards European Countries. However since the late 1970s the Chinese policy of 
"open doors" combined with effective internal economic transformations, helped to 
 
5The Economist, “China’s Belt-and-Road Plans Are to Be Welcomed—and Worried About,” 
July 26, 2018  
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regain its lost positions. By the early 1990s Beijing managed to restore relations with 
all Southeast Asian countries, and by the early 2000s create a basis for long-term 
cooperation and consolidation in the region (Vlasov, 2015). 
 
Association of Southeast Asian nations was formed in 1967, during the period of the 
Cold war. But only after collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 China and ASEAN 
relations started to boost so in  1996 China was granted the status of a full-scale 
partner of the Association. In the early 2000s, China joined the Treaty of friendship 
and cooperation in Southeast Asia, so it was a start of a new round of relations 
between the PRC and ASEAN began. Two giants also conclude the Joint 
Declaration on strategic partnership for peace and prosperity. This includes a series 
of five-year action plans. (Feinschmidt, 2018) In November 2015 foreign Ministers 
of China and the ASEAN member countries adopted the 2016-2020 plan. It is aimed 
at boosting political interaction, socio-economic issues, security, and international 
and regional relations. Nowadays, China is represented almost in all ASEAN 
multilateral negotiations in the Asia-Pacific region. They are the ASEAN Regional 
forum, the East Asia summit, the ASEAN+8 Council of defense Ministers, and the 
ASEAN+3 economic cooperation format. Thus, the relationship between China and 
ASEAN has a strong economic and political component. It is expressed in developed 
trade and investment cooperation and joint promotion of economic regional 
initiatives, as well as the ASEAN countries involvement in the implementation of 
China’s BRI (Fainshmidt R. I. 2018). Since 2005, China has been playing an 
increasing role in ASEAN economics. Figure 1 and Figure 2 prove that. ASEAN 
exports to China have risen from 3,2% in 2005 to 13,9% in 2018 and imports from 
China have risen from 5,4%  in 2005 to 20,5% in 2018. The USA and Japan used to 
be ASEAN’s main trading partners, but now their role is decreasing. 
 
Figure 1. ASEAN shares of merchandise exports values (%) by trading partners, 
2005-2018. 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors upon ASEANstats database https://www.aseanstats.org/  
 
Not only trading ties are strengthening. Investment cooperation from China to 
ASEAN countries is flourishing, as well. Figure 3 shows that Chinese top 5 FDI has 
6 times increased while FDI from Japan USA, EU have been diminishing. Over 7 
years of BRI implementation China has launched a number of investment 
infrastructure project, transport facilities of the region are developing. Railway 
communication (including high-speed branches), gas pipelines, bridges, airports and 
  Maxim Vasilyevich Chernyaev, Elena Aleksandrovna Egorycheva, 
Anna Vadimovna Korenevskaya, Antonina Vasil'evna Sharkova   
   
377  
 
seaports, power plants are being constructed. China provides to the region the 
necessary engineering skills and construction experiences, machinery and equipment 
as well as raw materials like cement and steel products. 
 
Figure 2. ASEAN shares of merchandise imports values (%) by trading partners, 
2005-2018. 
 
Source: compiled by the authors upon ASEANstats database https://www.aseanstats.org/  
 
Figure 3. Shares of ASEAN top 5 FDI sources (% to total), 2005-2018. 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors upon ASEANstats database https://www.aseanstats.org/  
 
Improved infrastructure facilities will be able to boost trade links along BRI 
corridor. A study by Roberts and Deichmann (2011) as well as Vidyarthi and Mishra 
(2020) showed that transport and telecommunications infrastructure plays a  
significant role in promoting spillovers when it interacts with regional  trade 
integration (Sarah, 2017). Figure 4 illustrates that manufacturing is the main sector, 
which attracts the most inward flows of FDI. 
 
Figure 4. ASEAN shares of inward flows of FDI by activities (% to total) 2018. 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors upon ASEANstats database https://www.aseanstats.org/  
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Due to neighboring such a powerful country like People's Republic of China BRI 
provides ASEAN nations a unique opportunity to develop their economies by 
deepening intra-regional cooperation. 
 
2. Methods 
 
A combination of various widely used methods forms the methodological basis of 
the research. The authors focus on the principle of scientific objectivity when 
carrying out the research. The theme of this research allows using classical scientific 
research methods such as: comparative method, statistical, system approach and 
others. The main research methods are the search, systematization, evaluation and 
structural and dynamic analysis of macroeconomic indicators that characterize 
ASEAN and China’s cooperation in the sphere of trade and investment. The 
statistical observation method was used to identify trends of intensification their 
economic relations. When describing China’s modern foreign economic policy, the 
method of scientific abstraction, analysis and generalization of existing fundamental 
research was used. Content analysis and synthesis methods were applied to identify 
the ideological content and essence of the Chinese BRI towards ASEAN countries. 
To conduct the research, the authors used statistical data from the international 
database of UNCTAD, database of ASEAN statistics and the state statistical office 
of the People's Republic of China. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative, since its inception in late 2013, has drawn tremendous 
global attention. The views of political leaders, business people, the media, and 
analysts on the prospect of the BRI are ostensibly polarized. Since then thousands of 
scholarly papers, journal articles and books have been issued. Some experts (Belova 
et al., 2019) asserts that the BRI will dramatically increase Beijing’s global 
influence, particularly in China’s neighborhood. Another group surmises that the 
BRI is expected to fail because of insurmountable challenges. Ha (2019) believes 
that China’s strategy “aims to reinforce the ongoing power shift in Southeast Asia 
and engineer a smooth transition to a China-centred regional order against the 
backdrop of a perceived decline in US influence in the region. In this process, some 
predilections towards the pre-modern Sino-centric hierarchical regional system have 
resurfaced as China seeks to renegotiate the normative content of the regional order, 
and condition ASEAN member states into “good behaviours” accordingly. 
 
More likely, through the BRI, China will definitely influence Southeast Asian 
countries but not to the extent of forging a Sinocentric order in the region (Gong, 
2019). This can be explained by three major factors: (a) the responses of Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states toward the BRI, (b) the 
effects of alternative infrastructure initiatives proposed by other major powers in 
Southeast Asia, and (c) China’s questionable ability to deliver its BRI promises 
(Gong, 2019). Jetin marks that a BRI key goal is to enhance economic 
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interconnectivity and cooperation across Eurasia, East Africa and more than 60 
partner countries. A similar emphasis on “connectivity” is found in the Masterplan 
on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (ASEAN 2016; Jetin 2017). 
 
Many scientists explore economic progression of ASEAN (Laique et al., 2019) due 
to China’s trade and investment expansion (Thaib, Hakimah, and Yolanda, 2020) as 
well as Taguchi et al. (2014) and others do.  In the last decade, China’s export share 
has risen in ASEAN countries trade turnover, reflecting their strengthening trade 
linkages with China as a global manufacturing base.  Although, according to 
UNCTAD data, China's ODI still accounts for less than 5 per cent of total inflows 
across ASEAN, this is expected to increase in future years under the BRI as the 
infrastructure investment boom is likely to lead to tangible increases in the trade of 
goods and services and investment across the region (Sarah, 2017). China’s 
economic rise over the past decade, caused conceptual changes in the characteristics 
of direct foreign investment: high urbanization growth rates, “building a middle-
class society” and the elimination of rural poverty, fundamental changes in 
environmental policy at the state level. This is what has allowed Vietnam, Indonesia 
and Malaysia to gain new competitive advantages and also become the leading 
recipients of foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia (Andronova et al., 2020). 
Thus, China has been able to become an important a partner for ASEAN as Japan 
and the United States, entering all the main dialogue platforms and initiatives 
developed by the Association (Fainshmidt, 2018). 
 
Lots of works are devoted to a particular ASEAN country and its economic 
positioning through participation with China. Syukur and Bungkilo (2020) examine 
the post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer companies in Indonesia as 
well as Ghozali and Khoirunurrofik (2020) do in their article. Rahman et al. (2020) 
indicate that, the goods market is the most significant market in promoting family 
takaful in Malaysia. Reinhard and Li (2008) cover that companies with better access 
to external capital and those that adjust their financial structures faster outperform 
other companies. 
 
Beijing sees BRI in part as an externally oriented development program to boost 
China’s slowing economy and help it move up the global value chain through 
economic integration with neighboring countries (Ratanavararak, 2018; Sudana et 
al., 2019).  Chinese planners believe infrastructure development in BRI countries 
can open new markets and boost foreign demand for Chinese products, particularly 
in higher-end manufactured goods. BRI analysts mark, that China offers partner 
countries much-needed infrastructure financing, but also presents significant risks. 
Through BRI China also seeks to diversify its energy suppliers (Chernyaev et al., 
2020). As well as to develop ASEAN energy sector under public-private partnership 
(Wisuttisak and Rahim, 2018). Chinese engagement with BRI countries has largely 
been through infrastructure projects financed by Chinese policy and commercial 
banks rather than direct investment. Chinese lending poses debt sustainability 
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problems for a number of BRI countries while providing Beijing with economic 
leverage to promote Chinese interests, in some cases threatening the sovereignty of 
host countries. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
So, the Belt and Road Initiative is a designed to foster and enhance connectivity 
throughout the world. China-Indochina Peninsula Economic corridor, or just 
CICPEC is supposed to rise connectivity between China and Southeast countries. It 
consists of several projects aimed at expanding ties between China and ASEAN 
countries. As for land transport, CICPEC seeks to connect Chinese cities (especially 
Kunming and Nanning) with cities located in Southeast Asian countries by the main 
land routes. The first is the Central route. It starts in Kunming, then goes to 
Vientiane and then to Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. The second one is the 
Eastern route. It connects Kunming with Hanoi via the Mengzi-Hekou railway, 
which began its operation in December 20146. From Hanoi, the route will lead to Ho 
Chi Minh city. And at last the third is Western Route. It is designed to connect 
Kunming with Yangon via the Dali-Ruili railway7 (Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, 
2019). 
 
CICPEC does not consist only of the abovementioned routes. There are other 
infrastructure projects within CICPEC aimed at creating key regional trade and 
logistics centers. The 250-kilometer Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima railway is an 
example. After it is built, it will connect Bangkok and Nakhon Ratchasima (the 
commercial center of Thailand in its North-Eastern part); subsequently, the road will 
be built to Nong Khai (the border city of Thailand and Laos) and eventually to Laos. 
Other projects are designed to develop transport infrastructure to major economic 
centers such as Guangzhou and Hong Kong. CICPEC includes as well projects for 
the development of sea infrastructure, new economic zones, industrial parks and 
tourist destinations in South-East Asia. For example, the Melaka Gateway project in 
Malaysia includes the construction of a cruise passenger terminal, a commercial 
city-center, and a marine industrial Park8. 
 
The Central route is the most realistic one among others. Some infrastructure objects 
have already been built or close to be completed. For example, the Kunming-
Vientiane railway is under construction and is expected to be completed by 2021. 
The construction of the first part of the Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima railway line in 
Thailand was completed in December 2017 and the entire railway is going to be 
 
6Ge, Jieru, 2014. “Mengzi-Hekou Railway to start operation in December”, China Daily, 3 
November. 
7Business Times, 2018. “A Primer on China’s Belt and Road Initiative Plans in Southeast 
Asia”, 2 April. 
8Aisyah, Fara, 2018. “Cloudy future for RM40b Melaka Gateway”, The Malaysian Reserve, 
12 September.  
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completed in 20229.  For the Melaka Gateway project, which was launched in 2014, 
the authorities announced that 60% of the work has already been completed and it is 
expected to be completed in 2025. As Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit (2019) writes in 
her article: “China has signed memoranda of understanding with some ASEAN 
countries on the joint development of economic cooperation zones. The one is the 
Mohan-Boten economic cooperation zone, the first inter-ethnic economic zone that 
was created by China in Southeast Asia. In 2015, Beijing and Vientiane signed a 
Joint master plan for the development of the Mohan-Boten economic cooperation 
zone, in an attempt to create such a zone on the borders of China's Yunnan province 
and Laos's Luang Namtha province”. In addition, in 2013 Malaysia and China 
established the Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) in Pahang, modeled on the 
Qinzhou industrial Park (CMQIP) in Guangxi province (Kaewkamol 
Pitakdumrongkit, 2019). 
 
Mosyakov and Shpakovskaya (2018) also mark that the BRI projects and innovation 
development projects are not the only prospects that China can offer to the ASEAN 
countries. There is also an equally ambitious "3 plus X" plan, which was put forward 
in November 2017 at the China-ASEAN summit in Manila by Chinese Prime 
Minister Li Keqiang. The "3 plus X" format will affect many different areas, mostly 
focusing on three key issues: political security, economy and trade, as well as 
people-to-people exchanges. It is interesting that the previous plan, called "2 plus 7", 
which Li Keqiang proposed in 2013, referred only to strengthening strategic trust 
and promoting economic cooperation. The new plan also added a provision on 
political security (Mosyakov and Shpakovskaya, 2018). 
 
Currently, Mie Oba (2019) points out, that several world powers, including the 
United States and China, middle powers, like Japan and some small powers, such as 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries, are 
promoting their regional multilateral approaches by proposing and advancing 
various regional frameworks. The development of regional frameworks, for 
example, the TPP/CPTPP, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 
AIIB, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and existing ASEAN-led regional architecture, 
indicate that each regional power is adopting the “institutional hedging” strategy to 
ensure that its interests are met and the regional order is sufficiently conductive to 
realizing its political and economic aims (Mie Oba, 2019). He and Feng (2020) 
suggest that China, in particular through its BRI, “might be a wild card in Indo-
Pacific regionalism in the future”.  The BRI appears to be an economic paradigm 
through which China supports investment in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region so 
as to create geostrategic neighborhood. China believe that peaceful and prosperous 
neighborhood will positively affect its northwestern and southwestern provinces. 
And prosperity can be reached by developed infrastructure. Bhavsar and 
 
9Bangkok Post, 2017. “Thai-Sino rail contract bids to kick off by year end”, Bangkok Post, 
16 August. 
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Sangapurkar (2018) indicate that the impact of new construction subsector on the 
economic growth is greater than that of repairs and maintenance construction 
subsector in the long run. 
 
Mingjiang Li (2020) analyses the BRI’s impact on maintaining security ties with 
South-East countries. Li points out that China seeks to protect its commercial routes 
and to ensure stability and safety in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, to compete mainly with 
the United States, another key player in the Indo-Pacific region. 
 
5. Result Analysis 
 
China regards the ASEAN countries as a “priority for its diplomacy towards 
neighboring countries”. China goes on to deepen their cooperation and to intensify 
their strategic partnership10. In 2018 at the China-ASEAN Summit, as Huang Xilian, 
the Chinese ambassador to Association of Southeast Asian, emphasizes, both sides 
adopted the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership Vision 2030. It provides 
strengthening cooperation in five areas. At first, to integrate the Belt and Road 
Initiative into the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, and intensify the "3+X 
cooperation framework". Secondly, to indicate new points for cooperation such as 
the digital economy, e-commerce, smart cities and 5G. Thirdly, to develop people-
to-people communication. Fourthly, to boost multilateralism:  openness of 
economies, free trade and win-win results. Fifthly, to promote safety and stability in 
the region (Huang Xilian, 2019). So, China and the ASEAN are launching a new era 
of greater cooperation under the guidance of the Vision 2030 and BRI 
implementation, in particularly under China-Indochina Peninsula Economic corridor. 
 
CICPEC is assumed to be will be economically beneficial to both China and the 
ASEAN countries, as it will strengthen trade and investment relations between 
countries in the region. It will also strengthen international entrepreneurship 
(Bogoviz et al., 2018). From the Table 1, we can see the China’s export and import 
share with ASEAN countries is steadily increasing. For the last 20 years of China-
ASEAN relations it has doubled. And due to BRI implementation it is going to see 
the further rise. 
 
Table 1. China’s export and import share with ASEAN countries. 
Period Import Share Export Share 
2001 7,94% 5,84% 
2002 9,04% 6,19% 
2003 11,47% 7,06% 
2004 11,22% 7,23% 
2005 11,36% 7,27% 
2006 11,31% 7,36% 
2007 11,35% 7,76% 
 
10Huang Xilian. Dynamic partnership promoting peace, stability and economic growth in 
East Asia China. Daily Global 2019 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201910/10/WS5d9e9db0a310cf3e3556fac6.html 
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2008 10,33% 7,99% 
2009 10,61% 8,85% 
2010 11,08% 8,76% 
2011 11,07% 8,96% 
2012 10,77% 9,97% 
2013 10,23% 11,05% 
2014 10,63% 11,61% 
2015 11,56% 12,15% 
2016 12,36% 12,08% 
2017 12,82% 12,30% 
2018 13,56% 12,79% 
Source: Compiled by the authors upon Unctad Statistical review China 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm [accessed 15.06.2020]. 
 
CICPEC can also help Chinese companies to refocus trade deals from the USA 
towards Southeast Asian economies. The Asian development Bank (ADB) estimated 
the damage to the Chinese economy from the implementation Sino-American trade 
war - this will reduce Beijing's GDP by 1 percent over several years11. In this case, 
CICPEC proposes to change the vector of trade relations from the United States 
towards deepening its trade and investment ties in Southeast Asia and thereby 
mitigate the consequences of Washington's tariffs and other protectionist measures 
against the Chinese economy (Figures 5 and 6). 
 
It is worth noting that China’s exports to ASEAN outruns China’s imports from 
ASEAN countries. But it has not been always. At the start of China-ASEAN 
relations China used to import more. From all ASEAN states Vietnam, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia are the main trade partners to China. The role of 
Philippines has largely increased lately. 
 
In order to stimulate trade agreements, within CICPEC, a number of cross-border 
economic zones have been created, such as the Friendship pass in Pingxiang. 
Pingxiang is a city in Guangxi province bordering Vietnam. Economic zone 
Friendship pass will create jobs for South-East Asian residents, so will solving the 
problem of employment in the region as well as gain benefits for Chinese enterprises 
as they will reduce their production costs by cheaper salary payments. Ensuring free 
flow of skilled labour among member states is a necessary step in ASEAN's effort to 
establish the ASEAN economic community (AEC) and to transform the region into a 
single market and production base (Aimsiranun, 2017). 
 
 
11ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANKADB. Economics Working Paper Series. The Impact of 
Trade Conflict on Developing Asia Abdul Abiad, Kristina Baris, John Arvin Bernabe, 
Donald Jay Bertulfo, Shiela Camingue-Romance, Paul Neilmer Feliciano, Mahinthan Joseph 
Mariasingham, and Valerie Mercer-Blackman No. 566 | December 2018 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/471496/ewp-566-impact-trade-conflict-
asia.pdf 
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Figure 5. China’s export to ASEAN countries from 2001 to 2018 (thous. US 
dollars). 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors upon Unctad Statistical Review China 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm [accessed 20.05.2020]. 
 
Figure 6. China’s import from ASEAN countries from 2001 to 2018 (thous. US 
dollars). 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors upon Unctad Statistical Review China 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm  [accessed 20.05.2020]. 
 
In addition, CICPEC can help to solve the problem of financing ASEAN projects. 
According to the ADB, in the period from 2016 to 2030, Southeast Asia will need 
2.8-3.1 trillion us dollars for the construction of infrastructure facilities. In other 
words, the region will need 184-210 billion us dollars annually. However, the 
ASEAN infrastructure Fund can only provide about $ 485 million. This lack of 
funding is due to the slow commissioning of such transnational projects as the 
construction of the TRANS-ASEAN gas pipeline and the establishment of the 
ASEAN Power Grid (Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, 2019). 
 
Since CICPEC is aimed at strengthening the interaction between China and 
Southeast Asia, it will therefore contribute to the growth of the flow of mutual 
foreign direct investment (FDI), the development of transnational production 
networks and the expansion of trade. Initial construction projects, underwritten at 
first by soft loans, in time also provide opportunities for all Chinese firms to learn 
more about foreign markets and develop networks (with local firms and politicians) 
and thus lead to new market opportunities (Sutherland et al., 2020).  Analysis by the 
ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic research office demonstrated that Chinese FDI to 
ASEAN and ASEAN FDI to China will grow to approximately us $ 500 billion and 
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us $ 200 billion, respectively, by 2035. It is also expected that it will increase the 
volume of trade turnover between the countries: it is expected that by 2035, China 
will account for 22 % of total ASEAN trade, and accordingly, the share of ASEAN 
in the structure of China's trade will grow to 16% 12. Given that trade and investment 
between China and ASEAN will evolve far in the region, the launch corridor 
CICPEC will strengthen these trends. 
 
Studying the projects of ASEAN countries, it is clear that CICPEC is clearly 
beneficial for them. Lyapina, I. indicated in her work institutional effects in 
development of regional innovational infrastructure (Lyapina, I. at al., 2019). For 
example, infrastructure projects may allow Laos to access the sea, eventually 
transforming it from a land-locked state to a state with access to the coast due the 
development of transport infrastructure. To develop this idea, the China-Laos 
railway network could be expanded to connect to Thailand's Nong Khai province 
and the Map Ta Phut seaport as well as to connect the Northern region of Laos with 
the electric grids13. 
 
Chinese firms such as Alliance Steel and Huawei Technologies have moved their 
manufacturing facilities out of China to the Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) in 
Pahang, Malaysia, thereby concentrating their direct investment there. According to 
some Malaysian authorities, this industrial Park has created about 19,000 jobs and 
will further attract us $ 7.3 billion in investment14. The Melaka Gateway Project will 
also attract additional Chinese investment, boosting employment and economic 
growth in Malaysia. Seeing the potential benefits of participating in CICPEC, 
Bangkok plans to link it with other countries around the world (Kaewkamol 
Pitakdumrongkit, 2019). The Eastern economic corridor is a special economic zone 
for high-tech industries such as smart electronics, robotics and aviation with the 
potential to attract $ 50 billion in investment to the Thai economy15. Figure 7 
illustrates the largest BRI Projects by estimated cost under CICPEC. 
 
 
 
 
12Poonpatpibul, Chaipat, Li, Wenlong, Foo, Suan Yong, Xinyi, Simon Liu, Tang, Xinke, and 
Tanyasorn Ekapirak, 2018. “China’s Reform and Opening-Up: Experiences, Prospects, and 
Implications for ASEAN”, Working Paper, WP/18-03, ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research 
Office (AMRO), October.  
13Business Times, 2018. “A Primer on China’s Belt and Road Initiative Plans in Southeast 
Asia”, 2 April. 
14Aziz, Mohamad Azim Fitri Abd, 2018. “Opposition creates hate sentiment against BN with 
MCKIP”, The New Strait Times, 30 April. 
15Pongsudhirak, Thitinan, 2018. “China’s Belt & Road impact on Thailand”, Bangkok Post, 
28 September; https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/thailand-targets-to-connect-belt-
androad-initiative-and-eec-to-boost-investment-opportunities-in-asean-300702545.html, 
on 22 March 2020. 
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Figure 7. Largest BRI Projects by Estimated Cost under CICPEC. 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors upon https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/east-
coast-rail-link-ecrl-project/, https://melakagateway.com/introduction/, 
https://www.travelchinaguide.com/china-trains/laos/, https://www.railway-
technology.com/news/srt-plans-to-postpone-signing-of-bangkok-nakhon-ratchasima-rail-
deal/, https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/database/projects/preah-vihear-kaoh-kong-
railway/30f0e054-f63c-404a-9fdf-773e87a8c6e5/. 
 
If all these designed projects will be completed a new reality will be created in the 
region. Southeast Asia might be turned into an area of China’s economy 
proliferation linked to Beijing through capital and investment flows, goods and 
services flows, and infrastructure and innovation projects. But from the other hand 
Southeast Asian countries will increase the level of its economics, urbanization, 
living standards will be improved, that will led to social stability in the region. 
 
Table 2 presents the information about dynamics of direct investment shares from 
China to the ASEAN countries. Objectives of real estate used to be among the main 
China’s investment interest. In 2018 the priory changed for the sphere wholesale and 
retail trade. Construction concentrated as well Chinese funds. Less investment 
attention is paid to activities for the provision of services, financial and insurance 
activities and electricity and gas supply. But such field as professional, scientific and 
technical activities were firstly introduced as China’s investment interest. 
 
Table 2. Dynamics of direct investment shares from China to the ASEAN countries 
(millions of US dollars). 
  2012   2015   2018 
Activities in the 
field of real estate 
1 907 Activities in the field of real 
estate 
2 006 Wholesale and retail 
trade 
3 604 
Transportation and 
storage 
1 715 Financial and insurance 
activities 
1 801 Activities in the field of 
real estate 
2 690 
Activities for the 
provision of services 
1 472 Production 742 Production 1 700 
Wholesale and retail 
trade 
1 319 Electricity and gas supply 554 Construction 950 
Financial and 
insurance activities 
524 Wholesale and retail trade 372 Financial and insurance 
activities 
431 
Undisclosed activity  481 Activities for the provision of 
services 
293 Electricity and gas 
supply 
283 
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Extraction of 
minerals 
285 Extraction of minerals 275 Activities for the 
provision of services 
268 
Construction 268 Transportation and storage 170 Agricultural industry 211 
Agricultural 
industry 
59 Undisclosed activity  111 Food supply (non-
Agricultural industry) 
89 
Information and 
communication 
42 Construction 72 Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 
82 
Source: Compiled by the authors upon ASEAN-Stat https://data.aseanstats.org/ . 
 
It means that process of digitalization is under consideration upon BRI. China 
intends to create the “Digital Silk Road” and to integrate such digital sectors like 
telecommunications, Internet of Things, and e-commerce, media. The joint 
communique from the 2017 Belt and Road Forum spoke of “strengthening 
cooperation on innovation, by supporting innovation action plans for e-commerce, 
digital economy, smart cities and science and technology parks”.16 
 
Chinese e-commerce giants like Alibaba and JD.com have linked their global 
expansion to BRI, identifying countries along the Belt and Road as among the most 
important markets for their expansion plans17. Alibaba has gone a step further, 
partnering with regional governments to facilitate crossborder e-commerce for small 
and medium-sized enterprises. It launched the world’s first digital free-trade zone in 
Malaysia in November 2017, followed by a second one in Thailand in April 201818. 
The digital free-trade zones provide a one-stop shop for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises to access foreign buyers and suppliers, logistics services, customs 
clearance, trade finance, and payment platforms. The Chinese and Filipino 
governments have partnered to create a new smart “city within a city” called the 
New Manila Bay City of Pearl 19. Alibaba and Malaysia signed a deal in January 
2018 to deploy its smart city platform City Brain in Kuala Lumpur; the platform 
leverages big data collection and processing capabilities, cloud computing, and 
artificial intelligence to improve traffic operations and emergency services response. 
On the whole, while the BRI is expected to yield positive benefit to China and Asia, 
there are risks and challenges to be watched closely. 
 
16Xinhua, “Full Text: Joint Communique of Leaders Roundtable of Belt and Road Forum,” 
May 15, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-05/15/c_136286378.htm 
17Celia Chen, “Who Is Richard Liu? Chinese Billionaire Seeks to Raise Profile as JD.com 
Expands outside China,” South China Morning Post, January 26, 2018; Rachel Brown, 
“Beijing’s Silk Road Goes Digital,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 6, 2017. 
18Alex Capri, “China’s Major Tech Firms Will Dominate Southeast Asia’s Emerging 
Markets: Who Wins and Who Loses?” Forbes, May 3, 2018 Alibaba Group, “Alibaba Turns 
eWTP into Reality with Creation of First Overseas E-Hub,” March 22, 2017. 
19HSBC, “Smart Cities Are Taking over, and over 50 Percent of Them Are in China,” CNBC, 
March 29, 2018; April Espejo, “City of Pearl: China Builds Massive Belt and Road 
Metropolis in the Philippines,” CGTN, September 18, 2017; Pamela Ambler, “Rising Tide: 
Small Businesses May Profit Most from China’s Belt and Road Projects,” Forbes, September 
12, 2017. 
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First, given the scale of China's lending to Belt and Road countries for infrastructure 
projects, financial risk could increase if projects are not well conceived or 
thoroughly planned. (Sarah, 2017). Then authorities in Laos, Cambodia and several 
other countries have pointed to environmental damage and droughts caused by 
Chinese hydropower projects along the Mekong river. As well as Myanmar 
authorities are concerned about the total deforestation and are trying to change the 
conditions for the construction of the port for $ 10 billion. Last November, Nepal 
suspended plans for China to build two dams for hydroelectric power plants 
(Lebedeva N.B. 2019). Distributional effects of foreign direct investment on poverty 
in Vietnam is under concern as well (Ngo, 2019). 
  
Southeast Asian countries are increasingly concerned about Beijing's ability through 
BRI projects to create debt trap problems for them in developing Asia. This 
perception was revealed in a 2019 survey by ISEAS, which revealed that 70% of 
ASEAN respondents agreed that their governments should be careful when making 
deals with Beijing in order to avoid falling into the trap of unsustainable debt20. This 
anxiety about the BRI has increased as ASEAN politicians have watched the 
situation unfold in Sri Lanka and Laos. Significantly, so as to avoid defaulting on its 
loans, the Sri Lankan government granted a 99-year lease to the port of Hambantota 
(a project funded by Chinese loans) to Beijing at the end of 2017. As a result, the 
Chinese state-owned enterprise such as Merchants Port Holdings will control this 
port (Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, 2019). 
 
To sum up, these cases have demonstrated that BRI participants can not only 
become debtor countries, but also lose sovereign control over their territory. Sri 
Lanka's debt burden forced its government to surrender control of its own seaport for 
99 years while a land concession in Laos indicated Beijing's Ability to dictate certain 
BRI terms in its favor. In Table 3 SWOT-analysis is given for BRI implementation, 
which summarizes its strong and weak points, opportunities and threats. 
 
Table 3. SWOT- analysis for BRI implementation. 
STRONG POINTS 
1. Territory closeness (neighbors) 
2. Close political and social ties 
3. Mutual interests for the region development 
4. Sufficient financing 
5. Developed trade agreements 
6. Developed investment links: some 
infrastructure objects have already been constructed 
7. Cheap human resources for China’s 
projects 
8. Jobs creation for ASEAN people 
9. Mutual free trade zones 
WEAK POINTS 
1. High interest rates on China’s 
credits to ASEAN countries 
2. Long negation processes on 
possible contracture objects 
3. Lack of trust to China’s BRI  
4. Low economic, political and social 
development of some ASEAN countries 
 
20Tang Siew Mun, Moe Thuzar, Hoang Thi Ha, Termsak Chalempalanupap, and Pham Thi 
Phuong Thao, 2019. “Survey Report State of Southeast Asia: 2019”, in ASEAN Focus, Issue 
1/2019, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, January, p. 11. 
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OPPORTUNITIES 
1. Economic rise  for some ASEAN countries 
due to improved infrastructure facilities in the region 
2. Standard of living in ASEAN countries will 
improve so they will buy more China goods 
3. US-China trade wars might have a positive 
effect on strengthening  links between China and 
ASEAN  
4. Through developed Railway  infrastructure 
China will have  the access to South China Sea 
THREATS 
1. Possibility not to return investment 
funds back (Risk for China) 
2. Less investment profitability in 
comparison with the other BRI projects 
3. Debt-threat for ASEAN nations 
which can lead to political dependence and  
lost  sovereignty 
4. World Crisis 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
China-ASEAN partnership is considered to be important, substantial and beneficial. 
It has become a driving force for economic development, cooperation and stability in 
East Asia (Huang, 2019). Economic landscape of the region is flourishing due to 
increased trade volumes and investments. Both China and ASEAN countries gain 
benefits from BRI. 
 
Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks. Critics often claim that China is using its 
massive Belt and Road Initiative as a form of "debt-trap diplomacy" to exert control 
over the countries that join the transnational infrastructure investment scheme. 
However, in fact, BRI may hold a different kind of risk - for China itself. At the 
recent BRI summit in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping seemed to acknowledge 
the 'debt-trap' criticism. In his address, Xi said that 'building high-quality, 
sustainable, risk-resistant, reasonably priced, and inclusive infrastructure will help 
countries to utilize fully their resource endowments.' This is an encouraging signal, 
as it shows that China has become more aware of the debt implications of BRI. A 
study by the U.S.-based Center for Global Development concluded that eight of the 
63 countries participating in the BRI are at risk of ‘debt distress’. But as John 
Maynard Keynes memorably put it, “If you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you 
have a problem. But if you owe your bank a million pounds, it has.” In the context of 
the BRI, China may turn out to be the banker who is owed a million pounds (Huang, 
2019). 
 
Unsurprisingly, some BRI partner countries are now demanding to renegotiate 
terms, and typically after the projects have started. China may be forced to offer ever 
more favorable concessions to keep the projects on track. In mid-April, for example, 
Malaysia announced that a major BRI rail project, put on hold by the government 
after last year's election, would now go ahead "after renegotiation." According to 
media reports, the costs of construction were reduced by as much as one third. Other 
BRI countries will probably also ask for debt forgiveness and write-offs, the costs of 
which will ultimately be borne by Chinese savers. 
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Nevertheless, China remains the main trade partner for some ASEAN nations so 
they have less possibilities to stand up China. It is confirmed by the policy of 
Philippines’ President who in order not to escalate contradictions with China 
distances his external policy as much as possible from the United States. At the same 
time some experts noted, that China’s purely economic benefit from trade relations 
with the ASEAN countries used to be not so great. China for quite a long time 
maintained a trade deficit with them (Dikarev, 2018). This is approach can be 
explained by not only economic, but also political priorities. Therefore, the standards 
of the Belt and Road Initiative are not about dependence, but about “win-win” 
position for all the participants. 
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